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Abstract
In July 2016, the European Commission presented its proposal for a regulation to
reduce greenhouse gases emissions in sectors not covered by the emissions tra-
ding system with regard to post-2020 binding targets. The proposal extends the
burden-sharing framework designed in 2008, and called the Effort Sharing Deci-
sion. This burden-sharing is based on a GDP per capita rule and aims to reflect
the economic capacity of each European Member State on the basis of its relative
wealth. However, several papers have pointed out that this way of allocating emis-
sions can result in great cost-inefficiencies, as the allocations do not take Member
State abatement costs into account. The proposal acknowledges this issue and pro-
poses a range of flexibility instruments (i.e., more than 15 flexibility options) that
intend to enhance cost-effectiveness. This paper evaluates the proposal and ana-
lyzes the economic impacts of each flexibility option with respect to fairness and
cost-effectiveness using a computable general equilibrium model. The performed
analysis demonstrates that flexibility mechanisms that allow “inter-Member state
flexibility” constitute the most efficient options. Specifically, they reduce com-
pliance costs and, simultaneously, increase fairness between low-income Member
States and high-income Member States.
Keywords: Effort Sharing Decision, European Union, Climate policy,
Computable general equilibrium model
Highlights
• I evaluate the new EU effort sharing decision with regard to 2030 European
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GHG emissions commitments for each European Member State.
• The economic impacts of 12 flexibility options listed by the European Com-
mission are analyzed with respect to fairness and cost-effectiveness.
• In term of overall efficiency, i.e., aggregated EU welfare cost, the most pro-
mising mechanism is the one that allows “inter-Member state flexibility”.
• If we are concerned about fairness among Member States and their econo-
mic capacities to implement decarbonization policies, the “inter-Member
state flexibility” mechanism is also the most attractive one.
1. Introduction
In July 2016, the European Commission (EC) presented its proposal for a re-
gulation to reduce greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions in sectors not covered by
the emissions trading system (ETS) with regard to post-2020 binding targets (Eu-
ropean Commission, 2016b). The proposal extends the burden-sharing framework
designed in 2008 (Commission of the European Communities, 2008) and called
the Effort Sharing Decision (ESD). The text proposes several new features of the
European framework aimed at limiting GHG emissions for the period 2021-2030.
As pointed out by Sartor et al. (2015), the proposal raises a new and critical chal-
lenge because it will be more difficult to comply with the 2030 targets than it was
in 2020. This is mainly because the overall emissions cuts required are deeper in
2030 (-30% with respect to 2005 levels) than they were in 2020 (-10%). More-
over, the ESD, based on GDP per capita and not on abatement potentials, leads
to the risk that a number of Member States (MS) may simply fail to meet their
targets (see, for example, the analysis performed at the MS level by Sartor et al.
(2015)). If the EC still wants to use a GDP per capita rule for allocating a GHG
budget across MSs, it requires the implementation of flexibility mechanisms to
achieve the GHG abatement at a lower cost. The EC proposal acknowledges this
issue and proposes a range of flexibility instruments (i.e., more than 15 flexibility
options) that intend to augment cost-effectiveness. The aim of this paper is to
evaluate the 2030 ESD and analyze the economic impacts of each of these flexibi-
lity options with respect to fairness and cost-effectiveness. I use the GEMINI-E3
model, which has been involved in the evaluation of the 2020 ESD (Bernard and
Vielle, 2009; Bo¨hringer et al., 2009), and more recently used in the assessment
of the ESD 2030 within the context of the United Kingdom decision to leave the
European Union (EU) (Babonneau et al., 2018).
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the
ESD proposal and details the flexibility mechanisms. Section 3 provides an over-
view of the computable general equilibrium model used to perform the simula-
tions, and explains how the welfare cost is computed. Section 4 presents the
scenario results. Section 5 concludes.
2. The Effort Sharing Decision
2.1. Overview
The “Energy–Climate” directive adopted in 2008 divided the European eco-
nomy into two parts (Delreux, 2019; Bo¨hringer, 2014; Bo¨hringer et al., 2009):
(i) sectors subject to the European ETS were chosen from those most energy-
intensive (primarily electricity generation); and (ii) all other sectors (non-ETS),
including the fossil energy consumption of households. The ETS constitutes an
exchange-tradable permits market for firms, characterized by one CO2 price (Ven-
mans, 2012). The allocation of allowances is primarily based on free allowances
with some auctioning. However, in the future, it is planned that auctioning will
become the default method (Hepburn et al., 2006). For the non-ETS market, CO2
abatement objectives are based on the so-called “Effort Sharing Decision”.
The ESD sets GHG emission targets for MSs according to their economic ca-
pacity, evaluated on the basis of their relative wealth measured by GDP per capita.
Two rounds of ESD were already defined, one for the year 2020 adopted in 2007
and the other one recently proposed for the year 2030 (European Commission,
2016b). Table 1 shows these two ESDs.
2.2. Flexibility options
The EC proposal lists 19 flexibility options that are organized into five ca-
tegories. The present paper adds two additional options (called F6 and F7) that
extend the coverage of some EC options. All of these flexibility mechanisms are
described in Table 2.
The first category is related to what the EC calls the “target adjustment”, which
is not, in a proper sense, a flexibility mechanism. Option T1 is the baseline option
computed from GDP per capita and presented in Table 1. The European Council
decided that these targets should be adjusted for high-income MSs, taking into
account cost-effective reduction potential. The adjustment is related to MSs ha-
ving a GDP per capita above the EU average in 2013 (see Table 1). It represents
11 countries, called “high-income MSs” in the proposal as namely: Luxembourg,
Denmark, Sweden, Ireland, Netherlands, Austria, Finland, Belgium, Germany,
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Table 1: Effort Sharing Decision (source: European Commission (2016b))
GDP per capita ESD target 2020 ESD target 2030
in e in % of 2005 levels
2013
Bulgaria (BGR) 5’800 20% 0%
Romania (ROU) 7’200 19% -2%
Croatia (HRV) 10’200 11% -7%
Hungary (HUN) 10’200 10% -7%
Poland (POL) 10’200 14% -7%
Latvia (LAT) 11’300 17% -6%
Lithuania (LIT) 11’800 15% -9%
Slovakia (SVK) 13’600 13% -12%
Estonia (EST) 14’400 11% -13%
Czech Republic (CZE) 14’900 9% -14%
Portugal (POR) 16’300 1% -17%
Greece (GRE) 16’500 -4% -16%
Slovenia (SVN) 17’400 4% -15%
Malta (MLT) 18’100 5% -19%
Cyprus (CYP) 21’000 -5% -24%
Spain (SPN) 22’100 -10% -26%
Italy (ITA) 26’500 -13% -33%
United Kingdom (GBR) 31’900 -16% -36%
France (FRA) 32’100 -14% -36%
Germany (DEU) 35’000 -14% -37%
Belgium (BEL) 35’400 -15% -38%
Finland (FIN) 37’400 -16% -39%
Austria (AUT) 38’100 -16% -39%
Netherlands (NLD) 38’700 -16% -39%
Ireland (IRL) 39’000 -20% -39%
Sweden (SWE) 45’400 -17% -40%
Denmark (DNK) 45’500 -20% -40%
Luxembourg (LUX) 85’600 -20% -40%
European Union 26’700 -10% -30%
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Table 2: Flexibility options
Name Definition Source
Target adjustment
T1 Baseline option EC
T2 Limited target adjustment for high-income MSs EC
T3 High target adjustment for high-income MSs EC
T4a 50% based on T1 and 50% based on a cost-effective emission reduction for high-income MSs (GHG40) EC
T4b 50% based on T1 and 50% based on a cost-effective emission reduction for high-income MSs (EUCO30) EC
One-off flexibility between ETS and non-ETS
O1 Baseline option, no flexibility between ETS and non-ETS EC
O2 One-off flexibility for eligible MSs with low access limits (from 2% to 4% of 2005 emissions per annum) EC
O3 One-off flexibility for eligible MSs with high access limits (from 4% to 8% of 2005 emissions per annum) EC
O2b Same as option O2 with additional MSs eligibility EC
O3b Same as option O3 with additional MSs eligibility EC
Options including LULUCF flexibility
L1 No use of LULUCF credits for compliance EC
L2 Use of up to 280 million tons of LULUCF credits for compliance EC
Options enhancing existing flexibility instruments
F1 Baseline option EC
F2 Increased permitted borrowing within the commitment period to 10% EC
F3 Central information site EC
F4 Central market place for AEA transfers EC
F5 Mandatory auctioning EC
F6 Increased inter-Member to 10% own
F7 Fully fungible ESD allocations own
Options enhancing existing flexibility instruments
C1 Baseline option EC
C2 Biennial compliance checks EC
C3 Compliance checks every fifth year EC
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France, and United Kingdom. These countries are together responsible for ap-
proximately 60% of GHG ESD emissions. This adjustment is computed from
simulations performed with the PRIMES and GAINS models, in which the GHG
abatements are implemented in a cost-effective manner. Their analysis lead to the
definition of the following four groups:
• Group 1: Germany, United Kingdom and France, where the gap between
option 1 and the results from the simulations assuming a cost-effective im-
plementation is below or around 5%;
• Group 2: Sweden and Finland, with a positive gap, but with some uncer-
tainties around it;
• Group 3: Austria, Denmark, Belgium and Netherlands, with a significant
gap below 15%;
• Group 4: Luxembourg and Ireland, with a gap above 15%.
The adjustments must leave the total abatement of high-income MSs unchan-
ged; which means that, if some MSs have to do less abatement, some others would
have to mitigate more. Option T2 increases the ambition of group 1 by 1 percen-
tage point, and decreases the ambition of group 3 and 4, respectively, by 3 and 9
percentage points. Group 2, however, remains unchanged. Option T3 sees high
adjustments, in which the target of group 1 is increased by 2 percentage points,
and 1 percentage point for group 2. In contrast, the target is decreased in group
3 and 4 by, respectively, 7 and 13 percentage points. Option T4 was suggested
by Belgium, and assumes that the targets are based for 50% on option T1 and
50% on a target based on a cost-effective emission reduction computed from mo-
del runs. Two simulations were utilized to compute this latter target, the GHG40
projection (based on the 2013 reference scenario (European Commission, 2013))
and the EUCO30 projection (based on the EU 2016 reference scenario (European
Commission, 2016b)), resulting in two options T4b and T4a, respectively.
Options O assume some flexibilities between ETS emissions and non-ETS
emissions. Option O1 is the current situation, in which emission reductions un-
der the ETS cannot be used for compliance in the non-ETS. However, the EC
established a new possibility, in which allowances from ETS can be transferred
to ESD allocations. These options are conditioned to the following two design
parameters: (i) eligibility, i.e., which MS can use this one-off mechanism; and (ii)
limit of access, i.e., the amount of ETS allowances that can be transferred to ESD
allocations.
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Figure 1: Change in allocations with respect to option T1 in percentage points (a positive number
means more allocations)
Option O2 allows one-off flexibility for the following countries with low access
limits:
• Luxembourg and Ireland (group A) have a limit equivalent to 4% of 2005
emissions per year;
• Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and Malta (group
B) have a limit equivalent to 2% of emissions per year.
Option O3 supposes high access limits. Luxembourg and Ireland can transfer
up to 8% of 2005 emissions. The countries listed in group B have a limit equi-
valent of 4%. Finally, the EC also considers two other options, in which France,
Germany, and United Kingdom are also included in this mechanism with a 2%
limit (option O2b) and a 4% limit (option O3b).
At present, credit generated in the land use, land-use change, and forestry
(LULUCF) sector cannot be used in the ESD for compliance (option L1) (Ellison
et al., 2014). Option L2 includes a limited use of credit coming from the LULUCF
sector that is equal to a maximum of 280 million over the period 2021-2030. This
amount is distributed to MSs on the basis of their share of agriculture non-CO2
emissions in the ESD. Table 3 shows this repartition.
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Table 3: Distribution of LULUCF credit (source: European Commission (2016b)) - option L2
Total limit credit Average annual limit as
in Mt CO2 (2021-2030) % of annual 2005 ESD
Austria 2.5 0.4%
Belgium 3.8 0.5%
Bulgaria 4.1 1.5%
Croatia 0.9 0.5%
Cyprus 0.6 1.3%
Czech Republic 2.6 0.4%
Denmark 14.6 4.0%
Estonia 0.9 1.7%
Finland 4.5 1.3%
France 58.2 1.5%
Germany 22.3 0.5%
Greece 6.7 1.1%
Hungary 2.1 0.5%
Ireland 26.8 5.6%
Italy 11.5 0.3%
Latvia 3.1 3.8%
Lithuania 6.5 5.0%
Luxembourg 0.25 0.2%
Malta 0.03 0.3%
Netherlands 13.4 1.1%
Poland 21.7 1.2%
Portugal 5.2 1.0%
Romania 13.2 1.7%
Slovakia 1.2 0.5%
Slovenia 1.3 1.1%
Spain 29.1 1.3%
Sweden 4.9 1.1%
United Kingdom 17.8 0.4%
European Union 280 1.0%
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Options F aim at enhancing flexibility within ESD emissions through “inter-
temporal flexibility” and “inter-Member state flexibility”. The extant rules already
allow such a flexibility, with a maximum of 5% of their annual emission alloca-
tions (option F1). Option F2 increases permit borrowing to 10%, but only from
the years 2021-2025. Options F3, F4, and F5 create new administrative tools or
institutions that intend to facilite flexibilities within ESD emissions. Option F3
creates a central information site that should record transfers. Option F4 involves
establishing a central market place for inter-Member state transfers. Option F5
creates mandatory auctioning. In the current paper, two other options, F6 and F7
are added, which are detailed in section 4.
Finally, options C consider compliance checks and periodicity of reporting.
Option C1 assumes annual compliance checks, C2 biennial compliance checks,
and C3 reports every fifth year.
3. The GEMINI-E3 model
3.1. Overview
GEMINI-E3 is a multi-country, multi-sector, recursive computable general
equilibrium (CGE) model (Bernard and Vielle, 2008) comparable to other CGE
models (EPPA, OECD-Env-Linkage, etc.), built and implemented by other mo-
deling teams and institutions, and sharing the same long experience in the design
of this class of economic models. The standard model is based on the assumption
of total flexibility in all markets, i.e., both macroeconomic markets, such as capital
and international trade markets (with associated prices being the real rate of inte-
rest and the real exchange rate, which are then endogenous), and microeconomic
or sector markets (goods, factors of production, etc.).
The current version is built on the GTAP 9 data base (Aguiar et al., 2016), and
the reference year is 2011. The industrial classification used in this study com-
prises 11 sectors. We describe five energy goods and sectors: coal, oil, natural
gas, petroleum products, and electricity. Transport is described through three sec-
tors: land transport, sea transport and air transport. Agriculture, energy-intensive
industries, and other goods and services constitute the remaining three sectors.
Sectors participating in the ETS market are petroleum products, electricity ge-
neration, and energy-intensive industries. Regarding spatial decomposition, this
version of GEMINI-E3 describes the 28 EU MSs, China, and the rest of the world.
International trade is represented through the Armington assumption (Arming-
ton, 1969), which assumes that domestic and imported goods are not perfectly
homogenous.
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It is worth noting that, in the present European version of GEMINI-E3, we
only considers CO2 emissions from energy combustion1.
3.2. Assessing welfare cost
Like other CGE models, GEMINI-E3 assesses the welfare cost of policies
through compensating variation of income (CVI). It is commonly acknowledged
that CVI is preferable to change in GDP or change in households’ final consump-
tion because these aggregates are measured at constant prices according to the
methods of national accounting and do not capture the change in the structure of
prices, which is a main effect of climate change policies. Moreover, it is informa-
tive to split the welfare cost between its two components, the domestic component
or deadweight loss of taxation (DWL) and the imported component or gains from
terms of trade (GTT). The GTT represent spill-over effects due to changes in in-
ternational prices. In a climate change policy, these GTTs come mainly from the
drop in fossil energy prices that results from the decrease of world energy demand.
Decomposition of the welfare cost into components is a complex issue that has
been addressed in the literature, mainly by Bo¨hringer and Rutherford (2002) in
the case of climate change policy, and by Harrison et al. (2000) in a more general
framework. Here, the aim is an approximate decomposition between domestic and
imported cost, in order to obtain a general idea of their relative importance. This
approach is justified by the fact that the change in prices, in particular the prices of
foreign trade, is fairly small. In practice, CVI is first calculated from the results of
the model, and the specification and coefficients of the demand function. GTT are
then calculated based on the results of the involved scenario using the following
equation:
GTT =
∑
i
∆Pexpi · Exporti −
∑
i
∆Pimpi · Importi (1)
where ∆Pexpi and ∆Pimpi represent changes in the exports and imports
prices (for product i), with respect to the reference scenario; and Exporti and
Importi represent the levels of exports and imports, respectively, in the reference
scenario. Finally, DWL is the difference between CVI and GTT.
1Other non-CO2 GHG emissions are not taken into account. However according to UNFCCC
inventory (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2018), these emissions
account for 19% of EU28 GHG emissions in 2016.
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4. Numerical implementation
4.1. Reference scenario
The GEMINI-E3 reference scenario is built on the time period of 2011-2030
with yearly timesteps; all prices given in this paper are in e2017. Assumptions
about population, GDP, and international energy prices are based on the EU re-
ference scenario 2016 (European Commission, 2016a). This projection supposes
that European GDP will grow by 1.4% per year between 2015-2030. MS GDP
growth rates are based on projections performed by DG ECFIN (European Com-
mission, 2015).
The model is calibrated in order to reproduce energy consumption and related
CO2 emissions from 2011 to 2015. It thus considers all previous policies imple-
mented since 2015, and especially those related to energy and climate fields.
4.2. EU architecture scenario
First, a scenario is simulated called the “EU architecture scenario”. After
2015, the targets defined in the ESD proposal and also the ones related to the ETS
market are implemented through carbon prices. Regarding the flexibility options
listed in Table 2, this scenario uses options T1, O1, L1, and C1. However, option
F1 is not taken into account in this scenario. Indeed, to be consistent with the
other options “1” that consider no flexibility mechanism, no flexibility is assumed
between ETS market and ESD emissions. However, option F1 is analyzed in
the next section. The present scenario assumes that ETS sectors participate in a
CO2 tradable market in which allowances are auctioned. The revenue from ETS
allowances are collected by EC and redistributed to MSs according to their ETS
emissions. In this market, the CO2 target consists of a 21% (43%) reduction in
2020 (in 2030) with respect to 2005 levels. Non-ETS sectors and households pay
a domestic CO2 tax on fossil energy consumption that is based on the ESD targets
presented in Table 1. The number of CO2 prices in EU is then one plus the number
of MSs (i.e., 29=1+28).
Table 4 presents the results of this scenario for the year 2030. First, it is
found that the ETS price is equal to 46 e in 2030, which is higher than the one
computed by the European Commission (2016a), which is equal to 33 e. In non-
ETS sectors, the average European CO2 price is equal to 209 e, but with sig-
nificant gaps among MSs. Regarding some low-income countries (e.g., Czech
Republic, Greece, Hungary, Portugal, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Croatia),
the burden-sharing proposal does not require any abatement for ESD sectors, and
thus the CO2 taxes are equal to zero. These overallocations may result in “hot
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Table 4: EU architecture scenario - year 2030
Components of welfare costa CO2 emissionsb CO2 taxc
Total GTT DWL ETS ESD Total ESD sectors
Austria -0.41% -2.05% 1.64% -23.3% -25.7% -24.9% 434
Belgium -0.81% -2.06% 1.26% -22.2% -25.8% -24.6% 357
Bulgaria 0.34% -0.23% 0.58% -38.9% 1.6% -28.8% 0
Croatia -0.09% -0.29% 0.20% -32.0% 0.9% -12.4% 0
Cyprus -0.48% -0.91% 0.43% -9.9% -9.3% -9.6% 71
Czech Republic 0.79% 0.05% 0.74% -46.9% 1.1% -32.4% 0
Denmark -0.13% -1.84% 1.72% -44.3% -26.0% -33.6% 399
Estonia -3.28% -5.80% 2.51% -10.5% -19.1% -13.9% 225
Finland 0.63% -0.46% 1.09% -31.2% -14.2% -24.2% 217
France 0.17% -0.60% 0.78% -23.4% -20.0% -20.9% 226
Germany 0.39% -1.56% 1.96% -38.1% -29.5% -34.3% 555
Greece -0.25% -0.33% 0.08% -30.2% 2.7% -15.1% 0
Hungary 0.29% 0.09% 0.21% -28.6% 0.7% -10.8% 0
Ireland -0.14% -2.39% 2.25% -33.8% -28.4% -30.5% 275
Italy 0.17% -0.15% 0.32% -27.5% -7.3% -16.2% 74
Latvia 0.48% 0.46% 0.02% -17.3% 0.8% -5.6% 0
Lithuania -0.92% -1.11% 0.19% -15.0% -16.7% -15.9% 140
Luxembourg -2.31% -4.44% 2.12% -19.3% -37.1% -33.9% 409
Malta 0.45% -3.96% 4.40% -10.9% -44.5% -30.5% 315
Netherlands -1.11% -3.23% 2.12% -26.4% -26.2% -26.3% 390
Poland 0.81% 0.03% 0.78% -47.7% -16.0% -36.6% 41
Portugal 0.00% -0.06% 0.06% -34.2% 1.6% -13.5% 0
Romania 0.86% 0.43% 0.43% -37.0% -1.2% -23.6% 0
Slovakia 0.83% 0.45% 0.38% -28.4% 0.4% -15.9% 0
Slovenia 0.37% 0.13% 0.23% -33.5% -2.5% -16.4% 25
Spain -0.04% -0.11% 0.07% -31.9% -0.4% -15.7% 10
Sweden 0.18% -1.25% 1.42% -23.3% -22.1% -22.5% 455
United Kingdom 0.32% -0.18% 0.50% -37.6% -17.5% -26.3% 158
European Union 0.15% -0.80% 0.95% -35.4% -16.8% -25.8% 209
ETS pricec 45
a in % of households consumption.
b change in % with respect to the reference scenario.
c in e2017 per ton of CO2.
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air”2 that could be sold to other MSs. Table 5 shows that other studies find similar
overallocations. These studies converge on the countries that are concerned, but
differ on the amount of “hot air”. However, these overallocations highlight the
weakness of the per capita rule to take into consideration existing situations (re-
garding current CO2 emissions) and also cost-effective abatement potential. Op-
positely, “old” MSs (e.g., Austria, Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands
and Sweden) with high-income levels have to implement significant abatements
that require CO2 taxes that are higher than 300 e. The other countries are in a
middle position, for example, France with a CO2 that tax equals 226 e, Ireland
with a CO2 tax that equals 275 e (Chiodi et al., 2013), and United Kingdom with
a CO2 tax that equals 158 e.
Table 5: “Hot air” within ESD emissions in 2030
Study Countries with “hot air” Emissions Amount
covered in Mt CO2-eq
European Commission (2016a) Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, GHG 50.8
Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia
Sartor et al. (2015) Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Hungary, GHG 24.5
Portugal, Romania
GEMINI-E3 Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Greece, CO2 from 29.8
Hungary, Latvia, Portugal, Romania energy
Slovakia combustion
The burden-sharing proposal results in an important disparity of effective CO2
emission reductions that range from -44.5% to +2.4%. In contrast, effective aba-
tements in the ETS sectors are more uniform and range from -44.7% and -11%.
Of course, this leads to similar findings in terms of welfare costs. It is worth
noting that, for some countries, GTTs counterbalance abatement costs. This is
the reason why some countries are better off after the CO2 policy. The GTT are
positively correlated to trade openness and the ESD tax3. These positive interna-
tional splillovers have been well established since the Kyoto Protocol especially
for energy-importing countries such as European countries (see (Bo¨hringer and
Rutherford, 2002; Bernard and Vielle, 2003). Finally, when subtracting the GTT,
all countries face a DWL.
2For an etymology of the word “hot air” see Victor et al. (2001).
3I estimate a linear regression between the GTT and these two variables. The following es-
timation is found: GTT = 0.0071 · Trade Openness + 0.00005 · ESD tax − 0.0096 with
R2=0.67
13
4.3. Target adjustments
Options T2 to T4b are simulated and compared to the EU architecture scena-
rio. The aim of these target adjustments is to reallocate efforts within high-income
MSs that take cost-efficiency and fairness into account. Allocations of MSs with
a GDP per capita below 30’000 e are unchanged, and the simulations reveal that
they are not impacted by these options. Therefore, I concentrate my analysis on
high-income MSs4. Table 6 gives welfare costs for the four groups identified in
the proposal. Surprisingly, in contrast to what is assumed in the proposal, I find
that groups 3 and 4 have welfare improvements when the EU climate policy is
implemented (see also Table 4 that details the results at the MS level). By sub-
tracting the GTT, we obtain a ranking that matches the initial intuition: countries
with a high GDP per capita and therefore a high level of effort face high DWL.
Nevertheless, considering the GTT and the results coming from GEMINI-E3, it
can be concluded that the options T are not required, as groups 3 and 4 are better
off. It is difficult to elaborate more on these options, as the results of the simulati-
ons conducted with the GEM-E3 and the GAINS models, that have been used to
justify the target adjustments, have not been published. However, it can be con-
cluded that options T2 to T4b effectively balance the DWL. In my simulations,
option T4a equalizes the DWLs in % of household consumption and leads to a
fair distribution of DWL across high-income MSs.
Table 6: Target adjustments scenarios - year 2030
EU architecture Option T2 Option T3 Option T4a Option T4b
Option T1
Welfare costa
Group 1 0.31% 0.33% 0.37% 0.37% 0.34%
Group 2 0.34% 0.33% 0.35% 0.29% 0.34%
Group 3 -0.72% -0.61% -0.46% -0.56% -0.56%
Group 4 -0.70% -0.65% -0.58% -0.66% -0.59%
European Union 0.15% 0.17% 0.21% 0.20% 0.18%
DWLa
Group 1 1.16% 1.25% 1.36% 1.34% 1.26%
Group 2 1.31% 1.30% 1.42% 1.20% 1.34%
Group 3 1.71% 1.33% 0.94% 1.21% 1.25%
Group 4 2.22% 1.14% 0.82% 1.30% 0.99%
European Union 0.95% 0.95% 0.96% 0.98% 0.94%
a in % of households consumption.
4The detailed simulation results of all scenarios presented in this paper are given in the Appen-
dix.
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4.4. One-off flexibility between ETS and non-ETS
I consider now options that link ETS markets and ESD emissions by allowing
MSs to use allowances coming from the ETS market in sectors covered by the
ESD. Again, only high-income MSs are allowed to use this flexibility mechanism.
However, in contrast to target adjustment options, this mechanism could impact
the other MSs (having a GDP per capita lower than 30’000 e) by increasing the
ETS price and the compliance cost of energy-intensive industries and electricity
generation sector. Table 7 presents the results of these simulations. Options O2
and O3 have very limited impacts on the results. This is not the case of option
O3b, however, where the welfare cost of high-income MSs and average ESD CO2
price are divided by two. Using ETS allowances within ESD sectors increases the
ETS price (by 25% with option O3b, for example), and therefore penalizes the
countries that do not participate in this flexibility mechanism. Low-income MSs
are the most impacted, with a welfare cost that shifts from 0.68% of household
consumption to 0.75%, because in these countries, the ETS sectors constitute a
larger part of the economy (Brink et al., 2016). In contrast, regarding the overall
efficiency of the EU climate change policy, option Ob3 cuts the EU welfare cost
by one-third.
4.5. Land use, land-use change, and forestry
In this scenario (i.e., option L2), the credits coming from LULUCF incre-
ase ESD allocations. Starting from 2021, these credits are gradually used with
the assumption that the total amount of LULUCF from 2021 to 2030 is equal to
the amounts given in Table 3. The credits used in year t (>2020) are equal to
(t − 2020) × 2×LULUCF
2030−2021 where LULUCF is the total amount of LULUCF. No
cost related to these credits is assumed, as LULUCF are not represented in this
version of GEMINI-E3. Several studies (Nabuurs et al., 2017; Michetti and Rosa,
2012), however, demonstrate that the cost savings from carbon sequestration by
LULUCF could be significant, up to 65% (Elofsson and Gren, 2018). For all MSs,
their DWL decrease as their ESD allocations increase, and the average ESD CO2
price drops from 209 to 173 e. The impact on the welfare cost depends on the
change in GTT. For some countries, less abatement means less gains in terms of
trade and an increase in the welfare cost (see, e.g., Lithuania, and Estonia). Ho-
wever, at the EU level, the incorporation of LULUCF credits reduces the welfare
cost slightly, with a shift from 0.15% to 0.12% of household consumption. It is
worth noting that this incorporation benefits only high-income MSs.
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Table 7: One-off flexibility between ETS and ESD emissions scenarios - year 2030
EU Architecture Option O2 Option O3 Option O2b Option O3b
Option O1
Welfare costa
Austria -0.41% -0.38% -0.34% -0.36% -0.30%
Belgium -0.81% -0.75% -0.68% -0.77% -0.73%
Bulgaria 0.34% 0.31% 0.28% 0.29% 0.26%
Croatia -0.09% -0.05% -0.02% 0.02% 0.13%
Cyprus -0.48% -0.47% -0.46% -0.43% -0.38%
Czech Republic 0.79% 0.79% 0.79% 0.81% 0.84%
Denmark -0.13% -0.08% -0.03% -0.08% -0.02%
Estonia -3.28% -3.25% -3.22% -3.30% -3.31%
Finland 0.63% 0.54% 0.46% 0.53% 0.45%
France 0.17% 0.17% 0.17% 0.13% 0.09%
Germany 0.39% 0.38% 0.37% 0.30% 0.22%
Greece -0.25% -0.23% -0.21% -0.17% -0.09%
Hungary 0.29% 0.28% 0.27% 0.29% 0.28%
Ireland -0.14% -0.22% -0.25% -0.23% -0.27%
Italy 0.17% 0.17% 0.16% 0.17% 0.17%
Latvia 0.48% 0.46% 0.43% 0.43% 0.39%
Lithuania -0.92% -0.96% -0.99% -1.03% -1.13%
Luxembourg -2.31% -2.09% -1.84% -2.04% -1.74%
Malta 0.45% 0.35% 0.27% 0.42% 0.39%
Netherlands -1.11% -0.99% -0.87% -1.01% -0.91%
Poland 0.81% 0.82% 0.84% 0.87% 0.95%
Portugal 0.00% 0.01% 0.01% 0.03% 0.05%
Romania 0.86% 0.85% 0.85% 0.86% 0.88%
Slovakia 0.83% 0.78% 0.74% 0.74% 0.65%
Slovenia 0.37% 0.34% 0.32% 0.32% 0.28%
Spain -0.04% -0.04% -0.04% -0.03% -0.02%
Sweden 0.18% 0.14% 0.12% 0.13% 0.09%
United Kingdom 0.32% 0.31% 0.31% 0.27% 0.23%
European Union 0.15% 0.15% 0.15% 0.12% 0.11%
MSs by GDP per capita in e
<10’000 0.68% 0.68% 0.68% 0.71% 0.75%
10’000-20’000 0.26% 0.26% 0.25% 0.27% 0.27%
20’000-30’000 0.06% 0.06% 0.06% 0.07% 0.08%
>30’000 0.13% 0.13% 0.14% 0.08% 0.05%
High-income MSs by group
Group 1 0.31% 0.30% 0.29% 0.24% 0.19%
Group 2 0.34% 0.28% 0.24% 0.27% 0.22%
Group 3 -0.72% -0.65% -0.57% -0.66% -0.59%
Group 4 -0.70% -0.70% -0.66% -0.70% -0.65%
ETS priceb 46 47 49 51 57
Average ESD CO2 priceb 209 199 190 179 152
a in % of households consumption.
b in e2017 per ton of CO2.
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Table 8: Land use, land-use change, and forestry scenarios - year 2030
EU architecture Option L2
Option L1
Welfare costa
Austria -0.41% -0.40%
Belgium -0.81% -0.80%
Bulgaria 0.34% 0.27%
Croatia -0.09% -0.02%
Cyprus -0.48% -0.36%
Czech Republic 0.79% 0.76%
Denmark -0.13% 0.03%
Estonia -3.28% -2.84%
Finland 0.63% 0.48%
France 0.17% 0.09%
Germany 0.39% 0.32%
Greece -0.25% -0.19%
Hungary 0.29% 0.28%
Ireland -0.14% -0.16%
Italy 0.17% 0.15%
Latvia 0.48% 0.45%
Lithuania -0.92% 0.13%
Luxembourg -2.31% -2.23%
Malta 0.45% 0.55%
Netherlands -1.11% -1.00%
Poland 0.81% 0.80%
Portugal 0.00% 0.02%
Romania 0.86% 0.81%
Slovakia 0.83% 0.73%
Slovenia 0.37% 0.45%
Spain -0.04% -0.02%
Sweden 0.18% 0.11%
United Kingdom 0.32% 0.26%
European Union 0.15% 0.12%
<10’000 0.68% 0.72%
10’000-20’000 0.26% 0.27%
20’000-30’000 0.06% 0.06%
>30’000 0.13% 0.08%
ETS priceb 46 46
Average ESD CO2 priceb 209 173
a in % of households consumption.
b in e2017 per ton of CO2.
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4.6. Inter-Member State flexibility
I next analyse flexibility mechanisms that allow a MS to transfer allowances to
another MS. In my EU architecture scenario, the existing rule, which is currently
limited to 5% of allowances is not assumed. Therefore, option F1, representing the
current situation, is simulated alone and compared to the EU architecture scenario
in Table 9. Moreover, two other scenarios are simulated that increase the percen-
tage of allowance to 10% and 15% (called F2 and F6, respectively). Finally, a
scenario (named F7), which assumes that ESD allowances are fully fungible is
also presented.
When inter-Member State flexibility is implemented, the EU abatement cost
decreases significantly. Option F1 decreases the EU cost by approximately 5.7
billion e, from 0.15% to 0.10% of household consumption with respect to the EU
architecture scenario. High-income MSs buy CO2 quotas from low-income MSs,
which implement CO2 abatement measures or only sell “hot air”. In 2030, quotas
from “hot air” represent 8.4 Mt CO2 sold by Greece, Portugal, Czech Republic,
Hungary, Bulgaria and Croatia. Main buyers are Germany and France, which
purchase respectively, 11.2 and 9.4 Mt CO2. 26 countries reach their 5% trading
constraint, and only Finland and Lithuania could buy and sell more, respectively.
This option benefits mainly low-income MSs (with a GDP per capita lower than
20’000 e), who can sell quotas and therefore benefit from additional revenue. In
contrast, if high-income MSs can buy cheap quotas and decrease their DWL, they
suffer from less gains in terms of trade. This result confirms that emissions trading
is not always beneficial, as pointed out by Babiker et al. (2004). In addition,
the average ESD CO2 price drops from 209 to 177 e, while the ETS price is
unchanged.
When the trading limit is increased, the EU marginal benefit decreases. Shif-
ting from 5% to 10% trading limit induces a 3 billion e gain at the EU level and
from 10% to 15%, the EU benefit is equal to 2.5 billion e.
If I assume fully fungible allocations within ESD emissions, the EU cost
equals only 3 billion e, which represents 0.02% of household consumption in
2030. For all MSs, the ESD price is equal to 145 e. This option creates signifi-
cant amounts of trading. In relative terms, the top buyer is Luxembourg, which
purchases 29% of its emissions allocation, and the top seller is Greece with a sel-
ling rate that equals 43% of its emissions allocation. In absolute terms, Germany
is the highest buyer (53.5 Mt CO2), and Greece is the top seller (18.8 Mt CO2).
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Table 9: Inter-Member State flexibility scenarios - year 2030
EU Architecture Option F1 Option F6 Option F7
Welfare costa
Austria -0.41% -0.22% -0.01% 0.35%
Belgium -0.81% -0.59% -0.32% -0.05%
Bulgaria 0.34% -0.37% -1.00% -4.95%
Croatia -0.09% -0.42% -0.66% -0.88%
Cyprus -0.48% -0.88% -1.11% -1.04%
Czech Republic 0.79% 0.35% 0.18% -1.19%
Denmark -0.13% 0.10% 0.29% 0.55%
Estonia -3.28% -2.19% -2.00% -1.88%
Finland 0.63% 0.59% 0.54% 0.47%
France 0.17% 0.25% 0.25% 0.24%
Germany 0.39% 0.37% 0.38% 0.56%
Greece -0.25% -0.54% -0.76% -2.54%
Hungary 0.29% -0.17% -0.42% -1.61%
Ireland -0.14% -0.03% 0.11% 0.20%
Italy 0.17% 0.03% -0.01% 0.01%
Latvia 0.48% -0.21% -0.75% -1.94%
Lithuania -0.92% -1.21% -1.22% -1.27%
Luxembourg -2.31% -1.84% -1.47% -0.19%
Malta 0.45% 0.47% 0.51% 0.80%
Netherlands -1.11% -0.71% -0.38% 0.06%
Poland 0.81% 0.41% 0.06% -0.26%
Portugal 0.00% -0.28% -0.42% -1.24%
Romania 0.86% 0.51% 0.07% -0.65%
Slovakia 0.83% 0.40% -0.03% -0.77%
Slovenia 0.37% -0.34% -0.91% -1.10%
Spain -0.04% -0.29% -0.47% -0.57%
Sweden 0.18% 0.22% 0.30% 0.40%
United Kingdom 0.32% 0.29% 0.28% 0.28%
European Union 0.15% 0.10% 0.07% 0.02%
<10’000 0.68% 0.27% -0.11% -0.81%
10’000-20’000 0.26% -0.09% -0.32% -1.23%
20’000-30’000 0.06% -0.14% -0.25% -0.42%
>30’000 0.13% 0.18% 0.23% 0.34%
ETS priceb 46 46 46 47
Average ESD CO2 priceb 209 177 174 145
a in % of households consumption.
b in e2017 per ton of CO2.
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5. Conclusion
In its new proposal, the EC has allocated an emissions target for non-ETS
sectors by MSs according to GDP per capita. This proposal raises several questi-
ons, as the targets do not take into account cost-effective potentials. The EC has
acknowledged this issue by proposing several flexibility mechanisms. The cur-
rent article, to the best of the author’s knowledge, constitutes a first assessment of
these flexibility mechanisms allowed within the EU Effort Sharing Decision for
the year 2030. Figure 2 summarizes my main findings.
Figure 2: EU welfare cost in billion e (right) and welfare cost in % of household consumption per
MS income level (left) - year 2030
In term of overall efficiency, i.e., aggregated EU welfare cost, the most pro-
mising mechanism is the one that allows “inter-Member state flexibility”. Indeed,
it tends to equalize CO2 taxes, and in this way, marginal abatement costs among
MSs. The downside of this mechanism is the use of “hot air” from several MSs
and therefore less EU CO2 emissions abatements in 2030. Using offsetting from
LULUCF reduces the EU welfare cost slightly by 4.4 billion e. Allowing trading
between ETS and non-ETS allocations also reduces the EU welfare cost if large
CO2 emitters (Germany, United Kingdom, and France) can participate in this me-
chanism (options Ob2 and Ob3). In contrast, the present study finds that options
T increase the EU welfare cost and fail to balance the burden among high-income
MSs. Unfortunately, the way that the policy options T were designed is rather non-
transparent, as the scenarios used to design the options have not been published.
However, the current analysis demonstrates that the design of this policy option
strongly depends on baseline assumptions and abatement costs by countries. In-
deed, target adjustment mechanisms open up the Pandora’s Box of lobbying and
bargaining powers (Viguier et al., 2006) between European actors (firms, States,
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NGOs). In addition, this option cannot take into account unforeseen future events,
such as economic downturns or energy price shocks, that would alter the cost hier-
archy between countries and necessitate a redefinition of burden-sharing. Finally,
allowing fully fungible ESD allocations (option F7) results in very low aggregated
EU welfare cost, estimated at 3.5 billion e. In this scenario, the ESD CO2 taxes
are equal to 145 e with an ETS price that equals 47 e.
If we are concerned about fairness among MSs and their economic capaci-
ties to implement decarbonization policies, the “inter-Member state flexibility”
mechanism is the most attractive one. With this mechanism, the welfare of low-
income MSs is improving and the richest MSs bear the cost of the climate policy.
As can been seen in Figure 2, the other options do not change the distribution of
burden-sharing significantly.
To conclude, with respect to efficiency and equity, it is essential to promote
trading between MS ESD emissions. The existing limit of 5% trading is too small
and must be increased. My simulations show that a 15% limit can significantly
reduce the EU’s mitigation cost and capture most of the gain from allowances
trading. This conclusion is in line with further assessments of EU burden-sharing
(Bo¨hringer et al., 2016, 2009; Cara and Jayet, 2011; Capros et al., 2011; Tol, 2009;
Bernard and Vielle, 2009). However, as the required GHG emissions abatements
increase (from 10% in 2020 to 30% in 2030), some MSs may not be able to
meet their targets or may bear welfare costs that are too high. As pointed out by
Sartor et al. (2015), such a failure would throw into question the credibility of the
European Effort Sharing Decision.
Finally, I compare my results with other models (i.e., macro-economic ones)
and find similar carbon prices. Indeed, Capros et al. (2014) report a CO2 price
ranging from 91 (GEM-E3 model) to 60 e2005 (NEMESIS model) in a “basic de-
carbonisation scenario” assuming that all technological decarbonisation options
are available and used according to cost optimality. With GEMINI-E3, this scena-
rio means that a uniform carbon price is implemented across MSs and emissions
(ETS and ESD). In this case5, I find a CO2 price that equals 70 e2017.
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Table 10: Scenario Option T2 - year 2030
Components of welfare costa CO2 emissionsb CO2 taxc
Total GTT DWL ETS ESD Total ESD sectors
Austria -0.39% -1.67% 1.28% -22.8% -22.1% -22.3% 343
Belgium -0.71% -1.68% 0.97% -21.8% -22.3% -22.2% 282
Bulgaria 0.32% -0.25% 0.57% -38.9% 1.6% -28.8% 0
Croatia -0.08% -0.29% 0.21% -31.9% 0.9% -12.5% 0
Cyprus -0.49% -0.93% 0.44% -9.9% -9.4% -9.6% 72
Czech Republic 0.78% 0.04% 0.74% -46.8% 1.1% -32.4% 0
Denmark -0.07% -1.47% 1.39% -44.2% -22.4% -31.4% 314
Estonia -3.30% -5.83% 2.53% -10.5% -19.2% -13.9% 226
Finland 0.62% -0.47% 1.09% -31.2% -14.3% -24.2% 219
France 0.20% -0.66% 0.86% -23.6% -21.3% -21.9% 249
Germany 0.43% -1.67% 2.10% -38.2% -30.7% -34.9% 597
Greece -0.26% -0.34% 0.08% -30.2% 2.7% -15.1% 0
Hungary 0.28% 0.08% 0.20% -28.5% 0.7% -10.8% 0
Ireland -0.23% -1.41% 1.18% -33.2% -17.9% -23.8% 139
Italy 0.17% -0.15% 0.32% -27.4% -7.4% -16.2% 75
Latvia 0.46% 0.44% 0.02% -17.3% 0.8% -5.6% 0
Lithuania -0.93% -1.13% 0.19% -15.0% -16.8% -16.0% 141
Luxembourg -1.88% -2.94% 1.06% -19.0% -27.8% -26.2% 252
Malta 0.45% -3.97% 4.42% -10.9% -44.6% -30.5% 315
Netherlands -0.94% -2.62% 1.68% -26.1% -22.7% -24.1% 309
Poland 0.80% 0.02% 0.78% -47.7% -16.1% -36.6% 41
Portugal 0.00% -0.06% 0.06% -34.2% 1.6% -13.5% 0
Romania 0.85% 0.42% 0.43% -37.0% -1.2% -23.6% 0
Slovakia 0.79% 0.43% 0.37% -28.3% 0.4% -15.9% 0
Slovenia 0.35% 0.11% 0.24% -33.4% -2.6% -16.4% 26
Spain -0.04% -0.11% 0.07% -31.9% -0.5% -15.8% 11
Sweden 0.17% -1.25% 1.43% -23.3% -22.2% -22.5% 454
United Kingdom 0.34% -0.22% 0.56% -37.8% -18.9% -27.2% 177
European Union 0.17% -0.77% 0.95% -35.4% -16.8% -25.8% 209
ETS pricec 45
a in % of households consumption.
b change in % with respect to the reference scenario.
c in e2017 per ton of CO2.
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Table 11: Scenario Option T3 - year 2030
Components of welfare costa CO2 emissionsb CO2 taxc
Total GTT DWL ETS ESD Total ESD sectors
Austria -0.33% -1.22% 0.89% -22.2% -17.3% -19.0% 242
Belgium -0.55% -1.22% 0.67% -21.4% -17.7% -19.0% 199
Bulgaria 0.29% -0.28% 0.57% -38.9% 1.6% -28.8% 0
Croatia -0.06% -0.28% 0.22% -31.9% 0.8% -12.5% 0
Cyprus -0.51% -0.95% 0.44% -9.9% -9.5% -9.7% 73
Czech Republic 0.77% 0.04% 0.73% -46.8% 1.0% -32.3% 0
Denmark 0.03% -1.03% 1.05% -44.1% -17.6% -28.5% 221
Estonia -3.35% -5.90% 2.54% -10.4% -19.3% -13.9% 227
Finland 0.66% -0.54% 1.20% -31.3% -15.8% -24.8% 249
France 0.23% -0.72% 0.95% -23.7% -22.6% -22.9% 273
Germany 0.47% -1.78% 2.25% -38.3% -31.9% -35.4% 641
Greece -0.28% -0.35% 0.08% -30.1% 2.7% -15.0% 0
Hungary 0.26% 0.07% 0.20% -28.5% 0.7% -10.8% 0
Ireland -0.21% -1.08% 0.86% -33.0% -13.3% -20.9% 96
Italy 0.16% -0.16% 0.32% -27.4% -7.5% -16.3% 76
Latvia 0.44% 0.43% 0.02% -17.2% 0.8% -5.6% 0
Lithuania -0.95% -1.14% 0.19% -15.0% -16.9% -16.0% 141
Luxembourg -1.65% -2.40% 0.74% -18.9% -23.7% -22.8% 199
Malta 0.43% -4.00% 4.43% -10.8% -44.6% -30.5% 315
Netherlands -0.71% -1.91% 1.20% -25.8% -17.9% -21.2% 219
Poland 0.79% 0.01% 0.78% -47.6% -16.2% -36.6% 42
Portugal -0.01% -0.07% 0.06% -34.2% 1.6% -13.5% 0
Romania 0.83% 0.41% 0.43% -37.0% -1.1% -23.6% 0
Slovakia 0.75% 0.40% 0.35% -28.2% 0.4% -15.8% 0
Slovenia 0.33% 0.10% 0.24% -33.4% -2.7% -16.5% 26
Spain -0.05% -0.12% 0.07% -31.9% -0.6% -15.8% 11
Sweden 0.18% -1.37% 1.55% -23.5% -23.6% -23.5% 495
United Kingdom 0.36% -0.26% 0.62% -37.9% -20.3% -28.0% 198
European Union 0.21% -0.76% 0.96% -35.4% -16.8% -25.8% 210
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a in % of households consumption.
b change in % with respect to the reference scenario.
c in e2017 per ton of CO2.
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Table 12: Scenario Option T4a - year 2030
Components of welfare costa CO2 emissionsb CO2 taxc
Total GTT DWL ETS ESD Total ESD sectors
Austria -0.38% -1.55% 1.17% -22.7% -20.8% -21.4% 314
Belgium -0.61% -1.43% 0.81% -21.6% -19.9% -20.5% 235
Bulgaria 0.32% -0.25% 0.57% -38.9% 1.7% -28.7% 0
Croatia -0.09% -0.29% 0.21% -31.9% 0.9% -12.4% 0
Cyprus -0.51% -0.94% 0.43% -9.9% -9.3% -9.6% 72
Czech Republic 0.79% 0.05% 0.74% -46.8% 1.1% -32.3% 0
Denmark -0.07% -1.46% 1.39% -44.2% -22.3% -31.3% 312
Estonia -3.21% -5.74% 2.52% -10.5% -19.1% -13.9% 222
Finland 0.52% -0.29% 0.81% -30.9% -10.0% -22.2% 141
France 0.18% -0.60% 0.78% -23.4% -20.0% -20.9% 225
Germany 0.53% -1.86% 2.39% -38.4% -32.9% -35.9% 680
Greece -0.28% -0.35% 0.07% -30.1% 2.7% -15.0% 0
Hungary 0.28% 0.08% 0.20% -28.5% 0.7% -10.8% 0
Ireland -0.23% -1.60% 1.37% -33.3% -20.2% -25.2% 163
Italy 0.17% -0.15% 0.32% -27.4% -7.3% -16.2% 74
Latvia 0.47% 0.45% 0.02% -17.3% 0.8% -5.6% 0
Lithuania -0.91% -1.11% 0.19% -15.0% -16.7% -15.9% 139
Luxembourg -1.92% -3.07% 1.15% -19.0% -28.8% -27.0% 264
Malta 0.43% -3.98% 4.41% -10.8% -44.5% -30.5% 314
Netherlands -0.88% -2.42% 1.54% -26.1% -21.4% -23.3% 282
Poland 0.80% 0.02% 0.78% -47.6% -16.0% -36.6% 41
Portugal 0.00% -0.06% 0.06% -34.2% 1.6% -13.5% 0
Romania 0.85% 0.42% 0.43% -37.0% -1.1% -23.6% 0
Slovakia 0.80% 0.44% 0.37% -28.3% 0.4% -15.9% 0
Slovenia 0.36% 0.13% 0.23% -33.4% -2.6% -16.4% 25
Spain -0.04% -0.11% 0.07% -31.9% -0.4% -15.7% 10
Sweden 0.17% -1.25% 1.42% -23.3% -22.1% -22.5% 451
United Kingdom 0.34% -0.22% 0.56% -37.7% -18.8% -27.1% 175
European Union 0.20% -0.79% 0.98% -35.4% -16.8% -25.8% 212
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Table 13: Scenario Option T4b - year 2030
Components of welfare costa CO2 emissionsb CO2 taxc
Total GTT DWL ETS ESD Total ESD sectors
Austria -0.41% -1.92% 1.51% -23.1% -24.5% -24.0% 402
Belgium -0.67% -1.55% 0.88% -21.7% -21.1% -21.3% 257
Bulgaria 0.30% -0.27% 0.57% -38.9% 1.7% -28.7% 0
Croatia -0.08% -0.29% 0.21% -31.9% 0.9% -12.4% 0
Cyprus -0.50% -0.94% 0.44% -9.9% -9.3% -9.6% 72
Czech Republic 0.78% 0.04% 0.74% -46.8% 1.1% -32.3% 0
Denmark -0.05% -1.34% 1.29% -44.2% -21.1% -30.6% 287
Estonia -3.32% -5.84% 2.51% -10.4% -19.1% -13.8% 225
Finland 0.66% -0.53% 1.19% -31.3% -15.6% -24.8% 246
France 0.15% -0.56% 0.70% -23.2% -18.8% -20.0% 205
Germany 0.42% -1.67% 2.09% -38.2% -30.7% -34.8% 595
Greece -0.27% -0.34% 0.08% -30.1% 2.6% -15.1% 0
Hungary 0.28% 0.07% 0.20% -28.5% 0.7% -10.8% 0
Ireland -0.24% -1.33% 1.09% -33.1% -16.7% -23.0% 128
Italy 0.16% -0.16% 0.32% -27.4% -7.3% -16.2% 75
Latvia 0.45% 0.43% 0.02% -17.3% 0.8% -5.6% 0
Lithuania -0.94% -1.13% 0.19% -14.9% -16.7% -15.9% 140
Luxembourg -1.64% -2.37% 0.73% -18.9% -23.5% -22.7% 197
Malta 0.39% -4.01% 4.41% -10.8% -44.5% -30.4% 316
Netherlands -0.81% -2.22% 1.41% -25.9% -20.2% -22.6% 260
Poland 0.79% 0.01% 0.78% -47.6% -16.0% -36.6% 41
Portugal -0.01% -0.07% 0.06% -34.2% 1.6% -13.5% 0
Romania 0.84% 0.41% 0.43% -37.0% -1.1% -23.6% 0
Slovakia 0.79% 0.42% 0.37% -28.3% 0.4% -15.9% 0
Slovenia 0.34% 0.11% 0.23% -33.4% -2.6% -16.4% 25
Spain -0.05% -0.12% 0.07% -31.9% -0.4% -15.7% 10
Sweden 0.17% -1.25% 1.42% -23.3% -22.1% -22.5% 452
United Kingdom 0.43% -0.32% 0.76% -38.2% -22.7% -29.5% 239
European Union 0.18% -0.76% 0.94% -35.4% -16.8% -25.8% 209
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Table 14: Scenario Option O2 - year 2030
Components of welfare costa CO2 emissionsb CO2 taxc
Total GTT DWL ETS ESD Total ESD sectors
Austria -0.38% -1.78% 1.40% -23.4% -23.3% -23.3% 370
Belgium -0.75% -1.81% 1.06% -22.3% -23.5% -23.1% 305
Bulgaria 0.31% -0.29% 0.60% -39.5% 1.6% -29.3% 0
Croatia -0.05% -0.29% 0.23% -32.4% 0.8% -12.7% 0
Cyprus -0.47% -0.90% 0.43% -10.2% -9.3% -9.7% 71
Czech Republic 0.79% 0.03% 0.76% -47.5% 1.0% -32.8% 0
Denmark -0.08% -1.58% 1.50% -44.8% -23.6% -32.3% 339
Estonia -3.25% -5.77% 2.52% -10.8% -19.1% -14.0% 222
Finland 0.54% -0.36% 0.90% -31.5% -11.4% -23.2% 165
France 0.17% -0.61% 0.78% -23.8% -20.0% -21.0% 225
Germany 0.38% -1.58% 1.96% -38.7% -29.5% -34.6% 553
Greece -0.23% -0.32% 0.09% -30.8% 2.5% -15.4% 0
Hungary 0.28% 0.07% 0.21% -29.0% 0.6% -11.0% 0
Ireland -0.22% -1.93% 1.71% -34.0% -23.7% -27.7% 207
Italy 0.17% -0.16% 0.32% -27.9% -7.3% -16.4% 74
Latvia 0.46% 0.44% 0.02% -17.7% 0.8% -5.8% 0
Lithuania -0.96% -1.14% 0.19% -15.2% -16.7% -16.0% 139
Luxembourg -2.09% -3.67% 1.58% -19.6% -33.0% -30.5% 331
Malta 0.35% -3.74% 4.09% -11.1% -43.2% -29.8% 296
Netherlands -0.99% -2.80% 1.81% -26.5% -23.8% -24.9% 333
Poland 0.82% 0.02% 0.81% -48.3% -16.0% -37.0% 41
Portugal 0.01% -0.06% 0.07% -34.7% 1.5% -13.8% 0
Romania 0.85% 0.41% 0.44% -37.6% -1.2% -24.0% 0
Slovakia 0.78% 0.40% 0.38% -28.8% 0.4% -16.2% 0
Slovenia 0.34% 0.10% 0.24% -34.1% -2.5% -16.6% 25
Spain -0.04% -0.11% 0.07% -32.4% -0.4% -15.9% 9
Sweden 0.14% -1.05% 1.20% -23.3% -19.5% -20.7% 379
United Kingdom 0.31% -0.19% 0.50% -38.1% -17.5% -26.6% 157
European Union 0.15% -0.76% 0.91% -35.9% -16.4% -25.8% 199
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Table 15: Scenario Option O3 - year 2030
Components of welfare costa CO2 emissionsb CO2 taxc
Total GTT DWL ETS ESD Total ESD sectors
Austria -0.34% -1.52% 1.18% -23.5% -20.8% -21.7% 313
Belgium -0.68% -1.57% 0.89% -22.5% -21.1% -21.6% 258
Bulgaria 0.28% -0.34% 0.62% -40.1% 1.5% -29.7% 0
Croatia -0.02% -0.28% 0.26% -32.9% 0.6% -13.0% 0
Cyprus -0.46% -0.89% 0.44% -10.5% -9.3% -9.8% 70
Czech Republic 0.79% 0.01% 0.78% -48.1% 1.0% -33.2% 0
Denmark -0.03% -1.34% 1.31% -45.3% -21.1% -31.1% 285
Estonia -3.22% -5.75% 2.53% -11.1% -19.1% -14.2% 220
Finland 0.46% -0.27% 0.73% -31.8% -8.6% -22.2% 118
France 0.17% -0.61% 0.78% -24.1% -20.0% -21.1% 224
Germany 0.37% -1.59% 1.96% -39.3% -29.5% -35.0% 552
Greece -0.21% -0.31% 0.10% -31.3% 2.4% -15.8% 0
Hungary 0.27% 0.05% 0.22% -29.4% 0.5% -11.2% 0
Ireland -0.25% -1.53% 1.28% -34.2% -19.1% -24.9% 151
Italy 0.16% -0.16% 0.33% -28.3% -7.3% -16.5% 73
Latvia 0.43% 0.41% 0.02% -18.0% 0.7% -5.9% 0
Lithuania -0.99% -1.18% 0.18% -15.4% -16.7% -16.1% 139
Luxembourg -1.84% -2.99% 1.15% -19.9% -28.8% -27.2% 266
Malta 0.27% -3.53% 3.80% -11.4% -41.8% -29.1% 278
Netherlands -0.87% -2.41% 1.54% -26.7% -21.4% -23.6% 283
Poland 0.84% 0.01% 0.83% -49.0% -16.0% -37.4% 41
Portugal 0.01% -0.06% 0.08% -35.2% 1.3% -14.1% 0
Romania 0.85% 0.40% 0.45% -38.1% -1.3% -24.4% 0
Slovakia 0.74% 0.36% 0.38% -29.2% 0.4% -16.4% 0
Slovenia 0.32% 0.08% 0.24% -34.7% -2.5% -16.9% 24
Spain -0.04% -0.12% 0.08% -32.8% -0.4% -16.1% 9
Sweden 0.12% -0.87% 0.99% -23.4% -17.0% -19.0% 311
United Kingdom 0.31% -0.20% 0.50% -38.7% -17.5% -26.8% 156
European Union 0.15% -0.72% 0.88% -36.4% -15.9% -25.8% 190
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Table 16: Scenario Option O2b - year 2030
Components of welfare costa CO2 emissionsb CO2 taxc
Total GTT DWL ETS ESD Total ESD sectors
Austria -0.36% -1.76% 1.40% -24.3% -23.3% -23.6% 367
Belgium -0.77% -1.83% 1.06% -23.3% -23.5% -23.4% 304
Bulgaria 0.29% -0.37% 0.67% -41.0% 1.4% -30.4% 0
Croatia 0.02% -0.28% 0.29% -33.5% 0.5% -13.3% 0
Cyprus -0.43% -0.87% 0.44% -11.0% -9.3% -10.0% 69
Czech Republic 0.81% -0.01% 0.82% -48.9% 0.9% -33.8% 0
Denmark -0.08% -1.59% 1.52% -46.1% -23.6% -32.8% 337
Estonia -3.30% -5.83% 2.54% -11.6% -19.1% -14.5% 222
Finland 0.53% -0.38% 0.91% -32.7% -11.4% -23.9% 164
France 0.13% -0.51% 0.64% -24.4% -17.5% -19.4% 185
Germany 0.30% -1.42% 1.72% -40.0% -27.3% -34.3% 479
Greece -0.17% -0.29% 0.12% -32.1% 2.2% -16.3% 0
Hungary 0.29% 0.05% 0.24% -30.0% 0.5% -11.5% 0
Ireland -0.23% -1.94% 1.70% -35.1% -23.7% -28.1% 205
Italy 0.17% -0.17% 0.34% -28.9% -7.3% -16.8% 72
Latvia 0.43% 0.41% 0.02% -18.6% 0.7% -6.2% 0
Lithuania -1.03% -1.21% 0.18% -15.8% -16.7% -16.3% 139
Luxembourg -2.04% -3.62% 1.58% -20.6% -33.0% -30.7% 329
Malta 0.42% -3.66% 4.08% -11.9% -43.2% -30.1% 293
Netherlands -1.01% -2.83% 1.81% -27.3% -23.8% -25.3% 332
Poland 0.87% 0.01% 0.87% -49.9% -16.0% -38.0% 41
Portugal 0.03% -0.06% 0.09% -35.8% 1.1% -14.4% 0
Romania 0.86% 0.39% 0.47% -38.9% -1.4% -24.9% 0
Slovakia 0.74% 0.34% 0.39% -29.8% 0.3% -16.8% 0
Slovenia 0.32% 0.07% 0.25% -35.5% -2.5% -17.3% 24
Spain -0.03% -0.12% 0.09% -33.4% -0.4% -16.4% 8
Sweden 0.13% -1.07% 1.19% -24.1% -19.5% -21.0% 378
United Kingdom 0.27% -0.14% 0.41% -39.1% -15.0% -25.6% 123
European Union 0.12% -0.71% 0.83% -37.1% -15.3% -25.8% 179
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Table 17: Scenario Option O3b - year 2030
Components of welfare costa CO2 emissionsb CO2 taxc
Total GTT DWL ETS ESD Total ESD sectors
Austria -0.30% -1.50% 1.20% -25.4% -20.8% -22.4% 307
Belgium -0.73% -1.61% 0.88% -24.4% -21.1% -22.3% 256
Bulgaria 0.26% -0.52% 0.77% -43.1% 1.2% -32.0% 0
Croatia 0.13% -0.26% 0.39% -35.0% 0.0% -14.2% 0
Cyprus -0.38% -0.83% 0.45% -12.1% -9.3% -10.5% 66
Czech Republic 0.84% -0.07% 0.91% -50.9% 0.7% -35.3% 0
Denmark -0.02% -1.37% 1.35% -47.8% -21.1% -32.1% 282
Estonia -3.31% -5.87% 2.57% -12.8% -19.1% -15.3% 218
Finland 0.45% -0.31% 0.76% -34.1% -8.6% -23.6% 115
France 0.09% -0.43% 0.52% -25.3% -15.0% -17.8% 148
Germany 0.22% -1.29% 1.51% -41.8% -25.1% -34.4% 411
Greece -0.09% -0.24% 0.15% -34.1% 1.7% -17.6% 0
Hungary 0.28% 0.01% 0.27% -31.4% 0.2% -12.2% 0
Ireland -0.27% -1.56% 1.28% -36.4% -19.1% -25.8% 148
Italy 0.17% -0.18% 0.35% -30.3% -7.3% -17.4% 70
Latvia 0.39% 0.36% 0.03% -19.9% 0.5% -6.7% 0
Lithuania -1.13% -1.30% 0.18% -16.6% -16.7% -16.6% 138
Luxembourg -1.74% -2.89% 1.14% -22.0% -28.8% -27.6% 262
Malta 0.39% -3.38% 3.77% -13.0% -41.8% -29.8% 273
Netherlands -0.91% -2.46% 1.54% -28.3% -21.4% -24.3% 280
Poland 0.95% -0.01% 0.95% -52.0% -16.0% -39.4% 40
Portugal 0.05% -0.07% 0.12% -37.3% 0.7% -15.3% 0
Romania 0.88% 0.36% 0.52% -40.8% -1.6% -26.1% 0
Slovakia 0.65% 0.24% 0.41% -31.3% 0.3% -17.6% 0
Slovenia 0.28% 0.01% 0.27% -37.6% -2.5% -18.2% 22
Spain -0.02% -0.13% 0.10% -34.8% -0.4% -17.1% 6
Sweden 0.09% -0.90% 0.99% -24.9% -17.0% -19.5% 309
United Kingdom 0.23% -0.11% 0.34% -40.7% -12.4% -24.8% 93
European Union 0.11% -0.63% 0.74% -38.7% -13.8% -25.9% 152
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Table 18: Scenario Option L2 - year 2030
Components of welfare costa CO2 emissionsb CO2 taxc
Total GTT DWL ETS ESD Total ESD sectors
Austria -0.40% -1.91% 1.51% -23.3% -24.5% -24.1% 400
Belgium -0.80% -1.94% 1.14% -22.2% -24.7% -23.8% 327
Bulgaria 0.27% -0.30% 0.57% -39.1% 1.4% -29.0% 0
Croatia -0.02% -0.27% 0.25% -32.1% 0.6% -12.7% 0
Cyprus -0.36% -0.68% 0.32% -10.1% -6.7% -8.1% 52
Czech Republic 0.76% 0.02% 0.74% -47.0% 0.9% -32.5% 0
Denmark 0.03% -0.96% 0.99% -44.2% -16.7% -28.0% 203
Estonia -2.84% -4.85% 2.01% -10.6% -16.6% -13.0% 185
Finland 0.48% -0.32% 0.80% -31.0% -10.1% -22.4% 142
France 0.09% -0.43% 0.53% -23.0% -15.5% -17.5% 155
Germany 0.32% -1.48% 1.80% -38.2% -28.2% -33.7% 509
Greece -0.19% -0.28% 0.09% -30.4% 2.2% -15.4% 0
Hungary 0.28% 0.06% 0.22% -28.7% 0.5% -11.0% 0
Ireland -0.16% -0.72% 0.57% -33.0% -7.9% -17.6% 53
Italy 0.15% -0.14% 0.29% -27.5% -6.2% -15.6% 61
Latvia 0.45% 0.43% 0.02% -17.4% 0.5% -5.8% 0
Lithuania 0.13% 0.10% 0.03% -13.8% 0.3% -6.0% 0
Luxembourg -2.23% -4.27% 2.04% -19.4% -36.6% -33.5% 394
Malta 0.55% -3.81% 4.36% -11.0% -44.3% -30.4% 307
Netherlands -1.00% -2.75% 1.76% -26.2% -23.5% -24.6% 324
Poland 0.80% 0.07% 0.73% -47.8% -12.5% -35.5% 28
Portugal 0.02% -0.05% 0.08% -34.4% 1.1% -13.9% 0
Romania 0.81% 0.38% 0.42% -37.2% -1.2% -23.7% 0
Slovakia 0.73% 0.36% 0.37% -28.5% 0.3% -16.0% 0
Slovenia 0.45% 0.28% 0.17% -33.6% 0.5% -14.8% 2
Spain -0.02% -0.08% 0.06% -32.0% 0.9% -15.1% 0
Sweden 0.11% -1.04% 1.16% -23.1% -19.3% -20.5% 367
United Kingdom 0.26% -0.18% 0.44% -37.6% -16.2% -25.6% 138
European Union 0.12% -0.68% 0.80% -35.4% -14.5% -24.7% 173
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Table 19: Scenario Option F1 - year 2030
Components of welfare costa CO2 emissionsb CO2 taxc
Total GTT CO2 Trade DWL ETS ESD Total ESD sectors
Austria -0.22% -1.61% 0.10% 1.28% -22.9% -21.9% -22.3% 311
Belgium -0.59% -1.66% 0.11% 0.96% -21.7% -22.1% -22.0% 269
Bulgaria -0.37% -0.50% -0.34% 0.47% -38.5% 1.7% -28.5% 0
Croatia -0.42% -0.40% -0.26% 0.24% -31.9% 0.9% -12.4% 0
Cyprus -0.88% -1.39% -0.16% 0.67% -9.8% -13.8% -12.1% 65
Czech Republic 0.35% -0.08% -0.24% 0.68% -46.9% 1.2% -32.4% 0
Denmark 0.10% -1.43% 0.10% 1.42% -44.5% -22.3% -31.4% 281
Estonia -2.19% -4.30% 0.34% 1.78% -10.7% -15.0% -12.4% 163
Finland 0.59% -0.35% 0.07% 0.88% -31.3% -11.1% -22.9% 159
France 0.25% -0.42% 0.09% 0.57% -23.2% -16.0% -17.9% 162
Germany 0.37% -1.28% 0.09% 1.56% -37.9% -26.0% -32.6% 363
Greece -0.54% -0.41% -0.18% 0.05% -30.0% 2.2% -15.2% 0
Hungary -0.17% -0.04% -0.27% 0.14% -28.6% 0.9% -10.7% 0
Ireland -0.03% -2.02% 0.15% 1.84% -33.7% -24.8% -28.2% 199
Italy 0.03% -0.34% -0.11% 0.47% -28.0% -11.9% -19.0% 132
Latvia -0.21% -0.03% -0.18% 0.00% -16.8% -3.6% -8.3% 75
Lithuania -1.21% -1.38% -0.04% 0.20% -14.5% -17.8% -16.4% 159
Luxembourg -1.84% -3.69% 0.15% 1.70% -19.5% -34.0% -31.3% 336
Malta 0.47% -3.47% 0.13% 3.81% -11.0% -41.7% -28.9% 241
Netherlands -0.71% -2.51% 0.15% 1.65% -25.9% -22.5% -23.9% 277
Poland 0.41% -0.21% -0.22% 0.83% -47.7% -20.2% -38.1% 107
Portugal -0.28% -0.14% -0.17% 0.02% -34.3% 1.5% -13.6% 0
Romania 0.51% 0.29% -0.19% 0.41% -37.1% -2.5% -24.2% 72
Slovakia 0.40% 0.23% -0.17% 0.34% -28.3% -2.2% -17.0% 83
Slovenia -0.34% -0.48% -0.19% 0.33% -33.6% -7.4% -19.1% 69
Spain -0.29% -0.33% -0.12% 0.16% -32.4% -5.4% -18.5% 71
Sweden 0.22% -0.94% 0.07% 1.09% -22.9% -18.2% -19.7% 293
United Kingdom 0.29% -0.21% 0.00% 0.50% -37.8% -17.5% -26.4% 159
European Union 0.10% -0.71% 0.00% 0.81% -35.4% -16.2% -25.5% 177
ETS Pricec 46
ESD quota pricec 159
a in % of households consumption.
b change in % with respect to the reference scenario.
c in e2017 per ton of CO2.
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Table 20: Scenario Option F6 - year 2030
Components of welfare costa CO2 emissionsb CO2 taxc
Total GTT CO2 Trade DWL ETS ESD Total ESD sectors
Austria -0.01% -1.21% 0.20% 1.00% -22.5% -18.2% -19.7% 239
Belgium -0.32% -1.27% 0.22% 0.73% -21.5% -18.4% -19.5% 206
Bulgaria -1.00% -0.73% -0.67% 0.41% -38.5% 1.9% -28.5% 0
Croatia -0.66% -0.47% -0.51% 0.32% -31.9% 0.8% -12.5% 0
Cyprus -1.11% -1.75% -0.32% 0.96% -9.8% -18.4% -14.8% 102
Czech Republic 0.18% -0.13% -0.34% 0.65% -46.9% 1.2% -32.4% 155
Denmark 0.29% -1.08% 0.20% 1.17% -44.5% -18.6% -29.3% 219
Estonia -2.00% -4.05% 0.39% 1.66% -10.8% -14.3% -12.1% 155
Finland 0.54% -0.38% 0.07% 0.85% -31.2% -10.9% -22.8% 155
France 0.25% -0.40% 0.10% 0.55% -23.1% -15.5% -17.5% 155
Germany 0.38% -1.03% 0.17% 1.24% -37.7% -22.5% -30.9% 291
Greece -0.76% -0.44% -0.36% 0.04% -30.0% 2.1% -15.2% 0
Hungary -0.42% -0.11% -0.41% 0.10% -28.5% 0.9% -10.7% 155
Ireland 0.11% -1.67% 0.28% 1.50% -33.6% -21.2% -26.0% 167
Italy -0.01% -0.40% -0.14% 0.53% -28.1% -13.4% -19.9% 155
Latvia -0.75% -0.42% -0.34% 0.02% -16.8% -8.7% -11.6% 108
Lithuania -1.22% -1.39% -0.03% 0.19% -14.5% -17.6% -16.2% 155
Luxembourg -1.47% -3.12% 0.29% 1.36% -19.5% -30.8% -28.8% 283
Malta 0.51% -3.03% 0.25% 3.29% -11.0% -39.0% -27.3% 217
Netherlands -0.38% -1.94% 0.28% 1.28% -25.8% -18.8% -21.7% 217
Poland 0.06% -0.45% -0.42% 0.92% -47.8% -24.4% -39.6% 121
Portugal -0.42% -0.18% -0.25% 0.01% -34.3% 1.5% -13.6% 155
Romania 0.07% 0.02% -0.37% 0.41% -37.3% -7.7% -26.2% 89
Slovakia -0.03% -0.04% -0.33% 0.34% -28.4% -7.3% -19.3% 94
Slovenia -0.91% -1.03% -0.38% 0.50% -33.7% -12.3% -21.8% 104
Spain -0.47% -0.53% -0.23% 0.28% -32.8% -10.3% -21.3% 105
Sweden 0.30% -0.67% 0.14% 0.83% -22.5% -14.3% -16.9% 223
United Kingdom 0.28% -0.21% 0.01% 0.49% -37.8% -17.2% -26.3% 155
European Union 0.07% -0.64% 0.00% 0.72% -35.4% -15.9% -25.4% 174
ETS Pricec 46
ESD quota pricec 155
a in % of households consumption.
b change in % with respect to the reference scenario.
c in e2017 per ton of CO2.
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Table 21: Scenario Option F7 - year 2030
Components of welfare costa CO2 emissionsb CO2 taxc
Total GTT CO2 Trade DWL ETS ESD Total ESD sectors
Austria 0.35% -0.63% 0.33% 0.64% -21.8% -12.1% -15.4% 145
Belgium -0.05% -0.87% 0.33% 0.50% -21.2% -13.9% -16.5% 145
Bulgaria -4.95% -3.13% -2.04% 0.22% -38.9% -20.3% -34.2% 145
Croatia -0.88% -1.63% -1.20% 1.95% -33.4% -11.1% -20.2% 145
Cyprus -1.04% -1.73% -0.31% 1.00% -9.9% -19.0% -15.2% 145
Czech Republic -1.19% -1.20% -1.06% 1.07% -47.2% -17.8% -38.3% 145
Denmark 0.55% -0.64% 0.32% 0.88% -44.4% -13.0% -25.9% 145
Estonia -1.88% -3.83% 0.42% 1.53% -10.9% -13.5% -11.9% 145
Finland 0.47% -0.38% 0.08% 0.78% -31.0% -10.2% -22.4% 145
France 0.24% -0.37% 0.11% 0.50% -23.0% -14.6% -16.9% 145
Germany 0.56% -0.44% 0.37% 0.62% -37.3% -12.6% -26.3% 145
Greece -2.54% -1.30% -1.42% 0.18% -30.4% -12.4% -22.1% 145
Hungary -1.61% -1.22% -1.08% 0.69% -29.7% -15.1% -20.8% 145
Ireland 0.20% -1.43% 0.36% 1.27% -33.5% -18.5% -24.3% 145
Italy 0.01% -0.38% -0.11% 0.50% -28.1% -12.6% -19.5% 145
Latvia -1.94% -1.46% -0.67% 0.19% -16.9% -20.3% -19.1% 145
Lithuania -1.27% -1.43% -0.01% 0.18% -14.9% -17.1% -16.1% 145
Luxembourg -0.19% -1.48% 0.77% 0.52% -19.1% -18.9% -18.9% 145
Malta 0.80% -1.56% 0.73% 1.63% -11.0% -27.1% -20.4% 145
Netherlands 0.06% -1.23% 0.46% 0.83% -25.4% -13.2% -18.3% 145
Poland -0.26% -0.77% -0.61% 1.12% -48.2% -29.4% -41.6% 145
Portugal -1.24% -1.17% -0.66% 0.59% -35.4% -14.5% -23.3% 145
Romania -0.65% -0.56% -0.69% 0.60% -38.2% -18.5% -30.8% 145
Slovakia -0.77% -0.71% -0.65% 0.59% -29.0% -19.3% -24.8% 145
Slovenia -1.10% -1.26% -0.40% 0.57% -33.8% -13.8% -22.8% 145
Spain -0.57% -0.71% -0.30% 0.44% -33.1% -14.9% -23.8% 145
Sweden 0.40% -0.35% 0.22% 0.54% -22.0% -9.1% -13.2% 145
United Kingdom 0.28% -0.20% 0.03% 0.45% -37.7% -16.3% -25.7% 145
European Union 0.02% -0.55% 0.00% 0.58% -35.4% -15.2% -25.0% 145
ETS pricec 47
ESD quota pricec 145
a in % of households consumption.
b change in % with respect to the reference scenario.
c in e2017 per ton of CO2.
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Table 22: Uniform tax scenario - year 2030
Components of welfare costa CO2 emissionsb CO2 taxc
Total GTT DWL ETS ESD Total ESD sectors
Austria 0.04% -0.37% 0.41% -26.3% -7.3% -13.8% 70
Belgium -0.38% -0.64% 0.26% -25.9% -8.1% -14.3% 70
Bulgaria -0.71% -1.69% 0.98% -46.7% -14.0% -38.5% 70
Croatia 0.65% -0.66% 1.31% -38.4% -7.9% -20.3% 70
Cyprus -0.30% -0.83% 0.53% -14.3% -11.0% -12.4% 70
Czech Republic 0.70% -0.62% 1.32% -54.2% -11.9% -41.4% 70
Denmark 0.28% -0.42% 0.70% -50.6% -7.7% -25.3% 70
Estonia -1.72% -2.54% 0.82% -15.4% -7.3% -12.2% 70
Finland 0.27% -0.36% 0.63% -36.8% -6.0% -24.0% 70
France 0.03% -0.25% 0.28% -26.9% -8.7% -13.7% 70
Germany 0.01% -0.44% 0.46% -44.2% -7.6% -27.9% 70
Greece 0.08% -0.32% 0.40% -37.6% -7.6% -23.8% 70
Hungary 0.11% -0.55% 0.67% -34.4% -9.8% -19.5% 70
Ireland -0.26% -1.03% 0.77% -38.9% -11.0% -21.8% 70
Italy 0.16% -0.25% 0.40% -32.9% -7.7% -18.8% 70
Latvia -0.36% -0.49% 0.13% -22.4% -12.9% -16.2% 70
Lithuania -0.98% -1.03% 0.06% -17.6% -11.4% -14.2% 70
Luxembourg -0.56% -0.73% 0.17% -24.4% -11.1% -13.5% 70
Malta -0.46% -0.87% 0.41% -14.6% -15.8% -15.3% 70
Netherlands -0.35% -0.87% 0.52% -29.5% -7.5% -16.7% 70
Poland 1.08% -0.20% 1.28% -55.7% -22.1% -43.9% 70
Portugal 0.00% -0.48% 0.48% -40.6% -9.0% -22.3% 70
Romania 0.69% -0.04% 0.73% -44.4% -12.4% -32.4% 70
Slovakia 0.16% -0.42% 0.58% -33.9% -13.1% -24.9% 70
Slovenia -0.17% -0.63% 0.46% -41.2% -8.3% -23.0% 70
Spain -0.05% -0.38% 0.33% -37.8% -9.2% -23.1% 70
Sweden 0.05% -0.27% 0.32% -25.6% -5.1% -11.6% 70
United Kingdom 0.17% -0.13% 0.30% -43.6% -10.3% -24.9% 70
European Union 0.08% -0.35% 0.44% -41.4% -9.6% -25.0% 70
ETS pricec 70
a in % of households consumption.
b change in % with respect to the reference scenario.
c in e2017 per ton of CO2.
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